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In the early summer of 1992 in Schluchsee, a quiet little resort town in Germany's Schwarzwald, a small group of neuroscientists were gathered around a television set in the lobby of a local hotel. I had the good fortune to be one of them. The morning session of the scientific meeting we were attending had just ended, and everyone else had gone off to lunch. We had stayed behind at the request of Giacomo Rizzolatti, Professor of Human Physiology at the University Parma, who said he had something exciting to show us and wanted our opinion about what it might mean. He slipped a videotape into the tape deck that he had managed to hook up to the hotel's television set and pushed ''play.' ' We found ourselves watching (and listening to) a video that Rizzolatti had made a few weeks earlier in his laboratory in Parma. In the video, a monkey was seated in a primate chair and was reaching out to grasp morsels of food placed in front of it by the experimenter, whom some of the scientists recognized as Rizzolatti's young associate, Leo Fogassi. We heard the familiar ''brrrrp'' of a stream of action potentials every time the monkey grasped a piece of food. Rizzolatti explained that the neuron we were listening to was located in the ventral premotor area, a brain region in the frontal lobes just in front of primary motor cortex, which Rizzolatti and his group had been studying since the early 1980s. So far, nothing on the tape seemed out of the ordinary. The neuron appeared to be coding the movements associated with grasping, just as many other neurons had done in the past when Rizzolatti and his group lowered microelectrodes into this region. Then something quite remarkable happened. The camera turned from the monkey to Leo Fogassi, who now, like the monkey, could be seen picking up pieces of food with his fingers. But as all of us could hear, the neuron continued to fire-and the timing of that firing was locked to Leo's grasping movements! All of us were stunned. Rizzolatti had shown us a neuron that fired not only when the monkey performed a particular action but also when the monkey observed another individual, in fact a member of another species, performing the same action. We didn't know it at the time, but we were among the first to witness a mirror neuron in action.
Nowadays, of course, anyone even remotely familiar with cognitive neuroscience knows about mirror neurons. They are routinely invoked to explain everything from action recognition to social cognition. As Rizzolatti explained in a recent interview for the New York Times (Blakeslee, 2006) , ''Mirror neurons allow us to grasp the minds of others not through conceptual reasoning but through direct simulation. By feeling, not by thinking.'' There is no denying that the idea of our own brain (and thus our own mind) resonating with the brains (and minds) of others is a compelling one. Indeed, the demonstration of mirror neurons at work is immediately captivating. Anyone who has seen Rizzolatti present the evidence cannot fail to be convinced that something important is being coded in those cells. Even now, more than 15 years after the first screening of the video at Schluchsee, Rizzolatti continues to show the footage of an ageless Leo Fogassi picking up pieces of food in front of what must by now be a long-dead monkey. He continues to show it because it is such a convincing demonstration that neurons can code both action and action observation. What this demonstration tells us about what these neurons are doing, however, is quite another matter.
Two new books have just been published on mirror neurons, both reviewing the history of experimental work that led to the development of the idea of mirror neurons and both discussing the implications of mirror neurons for our understanding what it is to be human. study of what has become known as the ''mirror neuron system'' in humans. Although both books go over much of the same material, the approaches taken by the authors couldn't be more different. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia have written a comprehensive review of the intricacies of mirror neurons, providing a detailed account of the relationship between these neurons and a range of sensory motor neurons in the frontoparietal cortex of the primate brain. Iacoboni's book is an altogether different project. In Mirroring People, Iacoboni has tried to write an accessible account of mirror neurons that anyone with an interest in the biological foundations of social behavior and the social brain would find interesting.
The early chapters of Mirrors in the Brain (translated from the Italian by Frances Anderson) review the pioneering work by Rizzolatti and others on the organization of motor systems in the primate brain. The main focus is on grasping and its relationship with vision, the sensory system that provides most of the information about the goal object. In telling their story, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia make the important point, often ignored by many cognitive neuroscientists, that the ultimate function of the brain is to control our movements-and that the extended sensorimotor circuitry that mediates this control also provides the neural substrate for much of what we might describe as ''higher'' cognitive functions. Indeed, the idea that our perception of action in others-and our understanding of other's intentions-depends on the recruitment of motor circuitry is central to the concept of mirror neurons.
As one might expect, most of the book is devoted to developing and extending the notion of mirror neuron systems. For Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, the primary role of mirror neurons, even in humans, is ''understanding the meaning of the actions of others'' (p. 124). When we see someone else performing an action, they argue, it is through the immediate activation of motor areas of our brain that we can decipher the meaning of that action. In other words, the resonance between the sight of the action and our motor system allows us to understand the goal of that action without any conceptual or semantic mediation. As I said earlier, this is a powerful and captivating idea. Indeed, some have argued that the mirror neurons provided the evolutionary springboard for the emergence of language and culture in hominids. One of the most visible promoters of this idea is V.S. Ramachandran (2000) , who has argued that the mirror neuron system ''holds the key to understanding many enigmatic aspects of human evolution . setting the stage for the complex Lamarckian or cultural inheritance that characterizes our species and liberates us from the constraints of a purely gene-based evolution. '' In the penultimate chapter of Mirrors in the Brain, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia discuss the possible role of mirror neurons in the evolution of language-invoking the idea that language grew out of a manual gestural system. It is no accident, they argue, that hand and mouth mirror neurons are colocated in the ventral premotor cortex of the monkey, a region that appears to be homologous with Broca's area in the human brain. Of course, as Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia acknowledge, the idea that the motor systems responsible for controlling the orolaryngeal musculature have been co-opted for speech recognition was already being advanced by Alvin Liberman (Liberman, 1957; Liberman and Mattingly, 1985) well before the mirror neuron craze began. Nevertheless, recent experiments on the echo-mirror neuron system, in which the perception of speech sounds is ''echoed'' in imperceptible movements of the vocal apparatus, provides some indirect support for this notion (Fadiga et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2003) .
In the last chapter of the book, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia propose that our understanding of emotions in other people may require the activation of the same circuitry that generates these emotions in ourselves-in a manner reminiscent of how our understanding of the intentions of others activates mirror neurons in our motor system. They argue that although we might be able to discriminate emotional expression without the activation of a mirror emotional system, our perception of these emotions would be, in the words of William James, ''purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth'' (James, 1890, p. 450) . In short, it is empathy that allows us to experience emotions in others.
I must say that I really enjoyed reading Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia's book. It is true that there are a few hiccups in the translation here and there (''saccadici'' for ''saccades,'' for example)-and some sentences that are difficult to unpack. But all in all, this is a ''must read'' for anyone interested in an authoritative and sometimes personal account of the history of mirror neurons and their (possible) role in action understanding, empathy, and social cognition.
Iacoboni's book, Mirroring People, covers much of the same territory as Mirrors in the Brain but in a much more accessible and chatty fashion. The book is full of personal anecdotes and amusing stories that not only illuminate the science but also capture the excitement of the scientific enterprise. In the early chapters, Iacoboni reviews the pioneering work by Rizzolatti and his colleagues on monkeys and then jumps right into his own work on the mirror neuron system in humans. He introduces the reader to the intricacies of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) without hiding behind technical language-but at the same time acknowledging the pitfalls and shortcomings associated with these and other modern neuroscience methods.
In later chapters, Iacoboni discusses the implications of mirror neurons and related brain circuitry for different aspects of the human condition, everything from autism and drug abuse to marketing and politics. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that Iacoboni may be even more enthusiastic about mirror neurons than Ramachandran! In the last chapter of Mirroring People, Iacoboni invokes the idea that mirror neurons may be the key to understanding how it is we relate to the world and our place within it-making our interactions with other people ''deeply meaningful.'' For this reason, he argues, the study of the mirror neuron system should be called ''existential neuroscience.'' Not everyone is as enamored of the mirror neuron hypothesis as Iacoboni is. Indeed, some have questioned the role of mirror neurons even in something as simple as basic action recognition.
After all, in order to for the mirror neuron to ''recognize'' Leo Fogassi's hand picking up the piece of food, the neuron has to receive highly processed input (even within a bootstrapping model) from visual networks that have parsed the scene and extracted form and motion information that presumably has been matched to stored templates about what hands are supposed to look like-as well as information about the goal and the relationship between the hand and the goal (for a discussion of this issue, see Csibra, 2005; Milner and Goodale, 2006) . But if all that work has already been done, what extra information is provided by the firing of mirror neurons? Almost certainly, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia's answer (and Iacoboni's too) would be that the recruitment of mirror neurons takes things beyond mere action recognition into the realm of action understanding. The activation of mirror neurons enables the monkey to experience directly what it is to grasp and eat a piece of food. Such implicit simulation, it is argued, allows the monkey to understand the intentions of others.
But this idea has also been challenged. Marc Hauser and his colleagues, for example, have studied the ability of macaque monkeys living in a colony on Cayo Santiago to figure out whether or not a human is about to throw a rock at them (Wood et al., 2007a) . These Old World monkeys living on an island colony in the Caribbean have a lot of experience with rock-throwing humans-and, not surprisingly, they are remarkably good at distinguishing between a realistic throwing movement and a partial throw or a throw that lacks sufficient torque or force to be a threat. But the fact that the monkeys can do this cannot be explained by appealing to mirror neurons. It turns out that macaque monkeys are physically incapable of throwing an object at a specific target, largely because of the anatomy and physiology of their shoulders, hips, and buttocks. They might throw their feces in your general direction at the zoo, but they won't be able to bean you with a well-aimed stone. On Cayo Santiago, the monkeys have never been observed throwing rocks at each other. In short, it is extremely unlikely that macaque monkeys have mirror neurons for throwing stones. This means that their understanding of stone-throwing by humans must depend on other mechanisms. Indeed, Hauser has pointed out that this dissociation between the monkeys' ability to perceive throwing in others and their ability to throw stones themselves resonates with a growing body of evidence showing that animals can exhibit perceptual competencies that do not show up in their motor repertoire (Wood et al., 2007b) , a conclusion that is consistent with the idea that the perceptual systems that provide understanding of the world evolved separately (to some degree) from the sensorimotor systems that mediate action in that world (see also Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and Goodale, 2006) .
Other objections to the mirror neuron hypothesis have come from philosophers. Pierre Jacob, for example, has criticized the attempts of some of the more ardent fans of mirror neurons to extend the hypothesis to a simulation account of mind reading, the cognitive ability to represent one's own and others' psychological states (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998) . Jacob (2008) concedes that mirror neurons might indeed fire both when a monkey (or human) executes an action toward a particular target and when the monkey (or human) observes someone else doing the same thing. But the role of mirror neurons, Jacob argues, is not to compute the observed agent's goal (or his or her intention), but to compute instead the motor commands that are required to achieve the goal. In other words, mirror neurons are seen as part of a system that computes an ''inverse'' internal model of the agent's actions, working backward from the perceived representation of the agent's goal to generate a model (in the observer's brain) of the motor commands necessary to achieve that goal (see also Csibra, 2005) . From this point of view, the function of mirror neurons is to reveal not the agent's intentions but rather what his or her next motor act might be. But as Jacob points out, if a mirror neuron ''takes a representation of an agent's prior intention as input and computes a representation of motor commands suitable to achieving this goal, then, of course, it does not generate a representation of the agent's prior intention'' (Jacob, 2008, p. 21, italics added) . Simply put (according to Jacob), mirror neurons use information about intentions to code the required actions, not vice versa.
So what do Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia and Iacoboni have to say about all of this? One shortcoming of Mirrors in the Brain and Mirroring People is that neither book deals with these kinds of critiques head on. Although one can certainly find arguments and experimental findings in different places in Mirrors in the Brain that speak to issues raised by the critics of the mirror neuron hypothesis, it would have been useful if Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia had devoted some part of the book to responding to their more vocal critics in a point-by-point fashion. Understandably perhaps, Iacoboni's book, which is a much more popular account of mirror neurons, spends almost no time exploring other interpretations of what mirror neurons might be doing-and, to my mind at least, often overstates their role in action understanding and the perception of intention. But perhaps this is asking too much. The task that Iacoboni set himself was not to write a scholarly monograph full of nuance and qualification. He wanted to write a book (and here I am doing a little mind reading of my own) that would capture the exhilaration and intellectual excitement of working on research that is central to what it is in our brains that makes us social beings. With Mirroring People, he has certainly succeeded.
I must confess that I was pretty excited myself when I first witnessed a mirror neuron at work in the video that Rizzolatti showed us in Schluchsee back in the summer of 1992. Hearing that neuron fire when Leo Fogassi picked up a piece of food in front of the monkey made it hard to resist the idea that such neurons play a special role in the perception of actions in others. But we shouldn't be misled into thinking that the undeniably clear correspondence in firing across action and action observation means that these neurons play the pivotal role in action understanding. Equally critical coding is almost certainly taking place in other neurons in the complex computational networks in which mirror neurons participate-but that coding is much harder to map onto what is happening out in the world. My guess is that mirror neurons, as fascinating as they are, will turn out to be only the beginning of what is likely to be a complicated story.
